

Court File No.

**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
COMMERCIAL LIST**

**BETWEEN:**

**BDC CAPITAL INC.**

Applicant

- and -

**BLUERUSH INC. and BLUERUSH DIGITAL MEDIA CORP.**

Respondents

APPLICATION UNDER Section 243 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended, and Section 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43, as amended

**FACTUM OF THE APPLICANT**

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**TO: SERVICE LIST**

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**PART I: OVERVIEW**

1. This Factum is filed in support of an application by BDC Capital Inc. ("**BDC**") for an Order appointing msi Spergel Inc. ("**Spergel**") as the receiver and manager (in such capacities, the "**Receiver**") under section 243 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended (the "**BIA**"), and section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as amended (the "**CJA**"), without security, over all property, assets, and undertakings of the respondents, BlueRush Inc. (the "**Borrower**") and BlueRush Digital Media Corp. (the "**Guarantor**"), and together with the Borrower, the "**Debtors**").
2. The Borrower owes BDC approximately \$2.6 million.<sup>1</sup>
3. After the expiration of the statutory notice period under s. 244 of the *BIA*, the Debtors entered into a Forbearance Agreement with BDC, which included consenting to the appointment of a receiver upon default or expiry of the Forbearance Period.<sup>2</sup>
4. The Forbearance Period has expired, the Debtors have failed to repay BDC, and BDC has satisfied the requirements for the appointment of the Receiver under the *BIA* and *CJA* to preserve the value of the Debtors' business and the BDC collateral.<sup>3</sup>

**PART II: FACTS**

5. The relevant facts for this application are set out below and in the Affidavit of Mark O'Connor, sworn December 16, 2025 ("**O'Connor Affidavit**"). All capitalised terms not otherwise defined have the meaning given to them in the O'Connor Affidavit.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> **Affidavit of Mark O'Connor**, sworn December 16, 2025 ("**O'Connor Affidavit**"), at para 10; Plaintiff's Application Record dated December 17, 2025 ("**AR**"), Tab 2, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> **O'Connor Affidavit**, at para 27(c), p. 24.

<sup>3</sup> **O'Connor Affidavit**, at paras 28-43, p. 25-27.

<sup>4</sup> **O'Connor Affidavit**, AR Tab 2, p. 16.

## Loan and Security

6. Pursuant to a Letter of Offer dated August 24, 2022, as amended, between BDC and the Borrower (the “**Loan Agreement**”), BDC agreed to extend the Borrower financing in the principal sum of \$2,000,000.00 (the “**Loan**”).<sup>5</sup>
7. The Guarantor provided a Guarantee in favour of BDC dated September 29, 2022 (the “**Guarantee**”) unconditionally guaranteeing the Borrower’s performance of all obligations and covenants under the Loan agreement, including the repayment of the Loan plus interest thereon as provided for in the Loan Agreement and BDC’s legal fees incurred.<sup>6</sup>
8. BDC and the Debtors entered into various letters of amendment to amend the Loan Agreement, the specifics of which are included at paragraph 9 of the O’Connor Affidavit, but that generally amended the interest payable, payment terms, underlying conditions, and other various terms and conditions of the Loan Agreement (collectively and together with the Loan Agreement, the “**Credit Agreement**”).<sup>7</sup>
9. As of December 16, 2025, the aggregate indebtedness owing under the Credit Agreement was \$2,624,756.05 plus accruing interest, fees, costs, and disbursements (collectively, the “**Indebtedness**”).<sup>8</sup>
10. The Debtors’ obligations under the Credit Agreement and Guarantee were secured by, among other things, General Security Agreements granted by each of the respective Debtors in favour of BDC dated September 29, 2022, and US and Canadian Patent and

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<sup>5</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, at para 7, p. 18.

<sup>6</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, at para 8, p. 18.

<sup>7</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, at para 9, p. 18.

<sup>8</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, at para 10, p. 19.

Trademark Security Agreements granted by the Borrower in favour of BDC (collectively, the “**Security**”).<sup>9</sup>

11. Pursuant to the General Security Agreements provided by the Debtors, upon an Event of Default, BDC can appoint a private receiver or apply to Court to appoint a receiver:

15.1 Upon any default under this Security Agreement BDC may declare any or all the Obligations whether or not payable on demand to become immediately due and payable and the Security Interests will immediately become enforceable. To enforce and realize on the Security Interests BDC may take any action permitted by law or in equity as it may deem expedient and in particular, without limitation, BDC may do any of the following:

(a) appoint by instrument a receiver, manager, receiver and manager or receiver-manager (the “Receiver” of all or any part of the Collateral, with or without bond as BDC may determine, and in its absolute discretion remove such Receiver and appoint another in its stead).<sup>10</sup>

12. BDC perfected its security interest in the personal property of both Debtors by registration of Financing Statements against the Debtors in the provincial registry maintained under the *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario), R.S.O c P.10 (“**PPSA**”).<sup>11</sup>

13. BDC is the only registered secured creditor of the Borrower.<sup>12</sup> The Guarantor has two other registered secured creditors in addition to BDC – the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (“**CIBC**”), with a prior registration to BDC, and Bonsai Growth Solutions Inc., with a subsequent registration to BDC.<sup>13</sup>

14. BDC and CIBC entered into a Priority Agreement dated September 22, 2022 (the “**Priority Agreement**”), which provides, *inter alia*, that the BDC security shall have priority over the CIBC security other than with respect to cash collateral of the Guarantor deposited by the

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<sup>9</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, at para 11, p. 20.

<sup>10</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, at para 12, p. 20; Exhibit ‘K’, p. 128; and, Exhibit “L”, p. 147.

<sup>11</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, at paras 13-14, p. 20-21; Exhibit ‘O’, p. 187; and, Exhibit ‘P’, p. 196.

<sup>12</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, at para 16, p. 21.

<sup>13</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, at para 17, p. 21.

Guarantor with CIBC, to a maximum aggregate principal amount of \$76,550.00 plus all interest thereon.<sup>14</sup>

15. BDC is therefore the first ranking secured creditor of the Debtors, other than the priority given to CIBC in the cash collateral of the Guarantor in the Priority Agreement.

### **Default and Forbearance**

16. The Borrower failed to repay the amounts owing under the Credit Agreement on the Maturity Date (April 30, 2025), which was an event of default.<sup>15</sup>

17. There were also further events of default, including a cease trade order being issued against the Borrower by the Ontario Securities Commission, the Debtors being in breach of their liquidity parameters and their minimum growth requirements, and the Borrower failing to remit its annual consolidated financial statements.<sup>16</sup>

18. On June 30, 2025, BDC made a written demand for repayment of the Indebtedness to the Debtors, and provided the Debtors with notice of its intention to enforce its security pursuant to section 244 of the *BIA* (the “**Demand Letters and NITES**”).<sup>17</sup>

19. BDC worked with the Debtors to address their ongoing financial issues, and the Debtors entered into an agreement with Oak Hill Asset Management Inc. to assist them with attracting investment to refinance and restructure their operations.<sup>18</sup>

20. On July 18, 2025, BDC entered into an Acknowledgement of Default and Forbearance Offer with the Debtors (the “**Forbearance Agreement**”).<sup>19</sup> BDC agreed to forebear

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<sup>14</sup> **O’Connor Affidavit**, at paras 18-19, p. 21-22; Exhibit ‘Q’, p. 199.

<sup>15</sup> **O’Connor Affidavit**, at para 21, p. 22.

<sup>16</sup> **O’Connor Affidavit**, at para 22, p. 22-23.

<sup>17</sup> **O’Connor Affidavit**, at para 23, p. 23.

<sup>18</sup> **O’Connor Affidavit**, at paras 24-25, p. 23.

<sup>19</sup> **O’Connor Affidavit**, at para 26, p. 23

from enforcing its rights against the Debtors until the earlier of (i) 90 days from the date of the Forbearance Agreement, being October 16, 2025; or (ii) the occurrence or existence of any Terminating Event (the “**Forbearance Period**”).<sup>20</sup>

21. The Forbearance Agreement included the following key terms:

- i. **Part I:** the Debtors acknowledged that as of July 18, 2025, they were indebted to BDC in the amount of \$2,440,800.87.<sup>21</sup>
- ii. **Part II:** the Debtors acknowledged the Existing Defaults as defined in the Forbearance Agreement and outlined in paragraphs 15 and 16 hereof.<sup>22</sup>
- iii. **Part III, Sections (1) to (3):** the Debtors acknowledged their liability under the Credit Agreement and Guarantee for the Indebtedness, which was due and payable.<sup>23</sup>
- iv. **Part III, Sections (4) to (6):** the Debtors acknowledged the Credit Agreement, Guarantee, Security, and Forbearance Agreement were valid, binding, and enforceable.<sup>24</sup>
- v. **Part III, Section (7):** the Debtors acknowledged the Existing Defaults had occurred and had not been rectified.<sup>25</sup>
- vi. **Part III, Section (10):** the Debtors waived any defences to BDC’s claim or enforcement.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, at para 27, p. 23-24.

<sup>21</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, Exhibit ‘S’, p. 212.

<sup>22</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, Exhibit ‘S’, p. 212.

<sup>23</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, Exhibit ‘S’, p. 213.

<sup>24</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, Exhibit ‘S’, p. 213.

<sup>25</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, Exhibit ‘S’, p. 213.

<sup>26</sup> O’Connor Affidavit, Exhibit ‘S’, p. 214.

- vii. **Part IV, Section (a):** the Debtors acknowledged the Forbearance Period would expire 90 days from the date of the Forbearance Agreement or upon the occurrence or existence of any Terminating Event.<sup>27</sup>
  
- viii. **Part IV, Section (f):** the Debtors specifically consented to the immediate appointment of a receiver and manager over all of their assets, undertakings, and property upon the expiration of the Forbearance Period in the form of the Commercial List Model Order, with such modifications BDC or its receiver may deem appropriate.<sup>28</sup>

### **Forbearance Agreement has Expired**

- 22. BDC worked with the Debtors to address their ongoing financial issues during the second and third quarters of 2024, during which time the Debtors entered into an agreement with Oak Hill Asset Management Inc. to assist them with attracting investment to refinance and restructure their operations.<sup>29</sup>
  
- 23. Despite BDC providing the Debtors with ample time to restructure and refinance their business, the Debtors have been unable to do so and have failed to present BDC with any viable proposals or plans to refinance and restructure their business.<sup>30</sup>
  
- 24. The Forbearance Period has expired and BDC has lost confidence that management of the Debtors will be able to repay the Indebtedness.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> O'Connor Affidavit, Exhibit 'S', p. 214.

<sup>28</sup> O'Connor Affidavit, Exhibit 'S', p. 218.

<sup>29</sup> O'Connor Affidavit, at paras 24-25, p. 23.

<sup>30</sup> O'Connor Affidavit, at paras 28-30, p. 25.

<sup>31</sup> O'Connor Affidavit, at paras 31-37, p. 25-26.

**PART II: LAW & ANALYSIS**

25. The only issue on this application is whether it is just and convenient to appoint Spergel as Receiver over the Debtors' property – the answer is yes.

**Technical Requirements**

26. Section 243(1) of the *BIA* and section 101(1) of the *CJA* provide the Court with jurisdiction to appoint a receiver where it is “just or convenient to do so”.<sup>32</sup>
27. Subsection 243(1) of the *BIA* provides:

**Court may appoint receiver**

243 (1) Subject to subsection (1.1), on application by a secured creditor, a court may appoint a receiver to do any or all of the following if it considers it to be just or convenient to do so:<sup>33</sup>

28. Subsection 101(1) of the *CJA* provides:

**Injunctions and receivers**

101 (1) In the Superior Court of Justice, an interlocutory injunction or mandatory order may be granted or a receiver or receiver and manager may be appointed by an interlocutory order, where it appears to a judge of the court to be just or convenient to do so.<sup>34</sup>

29. The technical requirements for the appointment of a receiver under the *BIA* have been satisfied:
- i. BDC is a secured creditor of the Debtors and is therefore entitled to bring an application under section 243 of the *BIA*.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>32</sup> [Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3](#), s.243 (“*BIA*”); [Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43](#), s. 101 (the “*CJA*”)

<sup>33</sup> [BIA](#), s. 243(1).

<sup>34</sup> [CJA](#), s. 101(1).

<sup>35</sup> [BIA](#), s. 243; **O’Connor Affidavit**, at paras 11-14 and 26-27, p. 20-21 and 23-25.

- ii. BDC delivered the Demands and NITES in accordance with section 244 of the *BIA*, and the 10-day notice period under the NITES, as required by subsection 243(1.1) of the *BIA*, which the Debtors waived in the Forbearance Agreement, has expired.<sup>36</sup>
- iii. Spergel is a licensed insolvency trustee and has provided its consent to act as the Receiver if so appointed and is qualified to act in that capacity.<sup>37</sup>

### **Proposed Receiver's Appointment is Both Just and Convenient**

30. In determining whether it is just or convenient to appoint a receiver, the Court must consider all of the circumstances, but in particular the nature of the property and the rights and interests of all the parties in relation thereto. These include the rights of the secured creditor pursuant to its security.<sup>38</sup>
31. When assessing whether it is appropriate to appoint a receiver, courts have considered several different factors, which are not a checklist and are viewed holistically, including:
  - i. The balance of convenience and whether irreparable harm might be caused if no order was made, although irreparable harm is not necessary where appointment is authorized by security documentation;
  - ii. The nature of the property, and the likelihood of preserving said property and maximizing return on the property;

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<sup>36</sup> *BIA*, s. 243(1.1); *O'Connor Affidavit*, at paras 23 and 27(c), p. 23-25.

<sup>37</sup> *O'Connor Affidavit*, at paras 42-43, p. 27; Exhibit 'U', p. 232.

<sup>38</sup> [\*Metropolitan Partners Group Administration, LLC v. International Credit Experts Inc., 2024 ONSC 4601 \(CanLII\)\*](#), at para 21 ("*Metropolitan Partners*"); [\*Business Development Bank of Canada v 170 Willowdale Investments Corp., 2023 ONSC 3230 \(CanLII\)\*](#), at para 50 ("*BDC v. Willowdale*")

- iii. Whether the lender has a contractual right to the receiver's appointment, and the enforcement of rights under a security agreement where the security-holder encounters or may encounter difficulties with the debtor;
  - iv. The loss of confidence in the debtor's management;
  - v. The conduct of the parties;
  - vi. The potential costs of the receiver and the best way to facilitate the work and duties of the receiver.<sup>39</sup>
32. Courts have held it is appropriate to appoint a receiver where: the lender's security may be at risk of deteriorating, there is a loss of confidence in the management of the debtor, and there is a need to stabilize and preserve the debtor's business.<sup>40</sup>
33. The existence of a contractual right to appoint a receiver upon default is of particular importance. As Justice Osborne held in *Metropolitan Partners Group Administration, LLC v. International Credit Experts Inc.*:
- Where the rights of the secured creditor include, pursuant to the terms of its security, the right to seek the appointment of a receiver, the burden on the applicant is lessened: while the appointment of a receiver is generally an extraordinary equitable remedy, the courts do not so regard the nature of the remedy where the relevant security permits the appointment and as a result, the applicant is merely seeking to enforce a term of an agreement already made by both parties.<sup>41</sup>
34. Where a secured creditor has the right to appoint a receiver, there must be a good reason to deprive that secured creditor of its bargained-for contractual right to appoint a receiver.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> [Metropolitan Partners](#), at para 23-24; [BCIMC Construction Fund Corporation et al. v. The Clover on Yonge Inc., 2020 ONSC 1953 \(CanLII\)](#), at para 45.

<sup>40</sup> [JBT Transport Inc.\(Re\), 2025 ONSC 1436 \(CanLII\)](#), at para 37.

<sup>41</sup> [Metropolitan Partners](#), at para 22. See also: [BDC v. Willowdale](#), at para 51.

<sup>42</sup> [Romspen Investment Corporation v. Atlas Healthcare \(Richmond Hill\) Ltd. et al, 2018 ONSC 7283](#), at para 100 (Tab 4 attached to this Factum).

35. The above-noted factors support the appointment of the Receiver being just and convenient.

**(a) BDC has a contractual right to appoint the Receiver**

36. In this case both the General Security Agreements and the Forbearance Agreement specifically provide for the appointment of a receiver upon default under the Credit Agreement.<sup>43</sup> The Forbearance Agreement provides that the Debtors:

....specifically waive the notice period pursuant to section 244(2) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, and subject to the expiration of the Forbearance Period, consent to the immediate appointment of a receiver and manager over all of its assets, undertakings, and property without further notice, on the terms and conditions set out in the model order for the appointment of a receiver attached to this agreement at **Appendix “B”**, with such modifications as BDC Capital and a receiver selected by BDC Capital consider appropriate.<sup>44</sup> (emphasis original)

37. The Debtors were in default when they entered into the Forbearance Agreement, and their consent to the appointment of a receiver therein provides a particularly compelling and important basis for granting the relief sought in this application.

38. Justice Kimmel’s statements at paragraph 53 of *JBT Transport Inc.(Re)* are directly applicable to the within application:

[53] However, where a creditor has a contractual right to appoint a receiver upon the debtor’s default, has already agreed to forbear and defer exercising its enforcement remedies and, in exchange, has received further confirmation of the Debtors’ consent to the appointment of a receiver if the forbearance did not lead to the promised refinancing of the debt: “Commercial certainty for all stakeholders dictates that parties should expect that courts will hold them to their bargains, absent further agreement or circumstances that would make it appropriate to nullify or remove the order”<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> **O’Connor Affidavit**, at para 12 and 27(c), p. 20 and 24-25; Exhibit ‘K’, p. 128; Exhibit “L”, p. 147; and, Exhibit ‘S’, p. 218.

<sup>44</sup> **O’Connor Affidavit**, Exhibit ‘S’, p. 218.

<sup>45</sup> [\*JBT Transport Inc.\(Re\)\*, 2025 ONSC 1436 \(CanLII\)](#), at para 53.

39. BDC has acted reasonably and worked with the Debtors to allow them time to obtain refinancing in the face of persistent and ongoing defaults. However, despite BDC's accommodations, the Debtors remain in default and have failed to present a viable proposal or plan to refinance and restructure their business despite the expiry of the Forbearance Period – BDC has “earned the right to exercise its enforcement remedy and appoint the Receiver.”<sup>46</sup>

**(b) The Existing Defaults are Continuing**

40. On June 30, 2025, following the Debtors' defaults under the Credit Agreement, BDC made demand and accelerated the Loan, and the Indebtedness became due and payable in full.<sup>47</sup>

41. The Forbearance Period has expired, and the Debtors' Existing Defaults at the time of the Forbearance Agreement are continuing and cannot be disputed, as the Debtors acknowledged in the Forbearance Agreement.<sup>48</sup>

42. The Indebtedness remains unpaid despite the expiry of the Forbearance Period and has only continued to grow since BDC's demand in June 2025.<sup>49</sup>

**(c) BDC has lost confidence in the Debtors**

43. Courts have consistently held that loss of confidence in the debtor and its management arising from a pattern of defaults or other various other difficulties is a factor that supports the appointment of a receiver.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> [JBT Transport Inc.\(Re\), 2025 ONSC 1436 \(CanLII\)](#) at paras 53-56

<sup>47</sup> [O'Connor Affidavit](#), at para 23, p. 23.

<sup>48</sup> [O'Connor Affidavit](#), at para 27, p. 23-25.

<sup>49</sup> [O'Connor Affidavit](#), at para 10 and 28-25, p. 19 and 25-26.

<sup>50</sup> [KingSett Mortgage Corporation v. 30 Roe Investments Corp., 2022 ONSC 2777 \(CanLII\)](#), at paras 32-35; [Callidus v. Carcap, 2012 ONSC 163 \(CanLII\)](#) at para 51.

44. BDC has been accommodating the Debtors since September 2024, first through a series of amendments to the Loan Agreement, and then in the Forbearance Agreement.<sup>51</sup>
45. This is not a case where BDC has rushed to Court to appoint a Receiver.<sup>52</sup> It has given the Debtors a reasonable opportunity to explore other options, including refinancing or restructuring. They have been unable provide BDC with any viable plan or proposal.<sup>53</sup>
46. The Debtors have been in default for a prolonged time. BDC is therefore entitled to take steps under its security to enforce payment of the Indebtedness, including its contractual right to appoint the Receiver to provide an effective and appropriate means to realize on the Security.<sup>54</sup>
47. BDC has acted reasonably. Despite BDC's accommodations, the Debtors remain in default under the Credit Agreement, Guarantee, Security, and Forbearance Agreement and have not provided BDC with a viable plan to repay the Indebtedness – BDC is therefore entitled to its contractual right to exercise its enforcement remedy and appoint the Receiver.<sup>55</sup>

***(d) The Appointment of the Receiver is Necessary***

48. The appointment of the proposed Receiver is necessary to preserve the value BDC has already invested in the company, to assess the Borrower's financial state, and to determine a strategy to recover assets and maximise value for all stakeholders in accordance with their interests.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> **O'Connor Affidavit**, at paras 9 and 21-27, p. 18-19 and 22-25.

<sup>52</sup> [\*BDC v. Willowdale\*](#), at paras 61-69; [\*JBT Transport Inc.\(Re\), 2025 ONSC 1436 \(CanLII\)\*](#) at para 54.

<sup>53</sup> **O'Connor Affidavit**, at paras 28-30, p. 25.

<sup>54</sup> [\*KingSett Mortgage Corporation v. 30 Roe Investments Corp., 2022 ONSC 2777 \(CanLII\)\*](#), para 35.

<sup>55</sup> [\*JBT Transport Inc.\(Re\), 2025 ONSC 1436 \(CanLII\)\*](#) at paras 51-56; [\*BDC v. Willowdale\*](#), paras 61-69.

<sup>56</sup> **O'Connor Affidavit**, at paras 35-41, p. 26-27.

49. If this Court appoints the Proposed Receiver, it is proposed that a related charge be granted (the “**Receiver’s Charge**”) to secure the Receiver’s and its counsel’s fees and disbursements, with the priority set out in the proposed appointment Order. Such court-ordered priority charges are typical in receiverships, as reflected in the model receivership order, and are expressly contemplated by s. 243(6) of the *BIA*.<sup>57</sup>

**PART III: CONCLUSION & ORDER SOUGHT**

50. The Applicant respectfully request that the Court grant the proposed Order appointing Spergel as Receiver over the Debtors’ property, substantially in the form attached as Tab 3 to the Application Record.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

Date: December 17, 2025



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<sup>57</sup> *BIA*, s. 243(6).

## TAB 2

Authority	Paragraph Reference
<u><a href="#">Metropolitan Partners Group Administration, LLC v. International Credit Experts Inc., 2024 ONSC 4601 (CanLII)</a></u>	21-24
<u><a href="#">Business Development Bank of Canada v 170 Willowdale Investments Corp., 2023 ONSC 3230 (CanLII)</a></u> ,	50-52; 65-69; 80-82
<u><a href="#">JBT Transport Inc.(Re), 2025 ONSC 1436 (CanLII)</a></u>	37; 53-56
<u><a href="#">BCIMC Construction Fund Corporation et al. v. The Clover on Yonge Inc., 2020 ONSC 1953 (CanLII)</a></u>	45
<u><a href="#">KingSett Mortgage Corporation v. 30 Roe Investments Corp., 2022 ONSC 2777 (CanLII)</a></u>	32-35
<u><a href="#">Callidus v. Carcap, 2012 ONSC 163 (CanLII)</a></u>	51
<i>Romspen Investment Corporation v. Atlas Healthcare (Richmond Hill) Ltd. et al, 2018 ONSC 7283, (Tab 4)</i>	100

I, Eric Dwyer, certify that I am satisfied as to the authenticity of every authority cited in this Factum.

Date: December 17, 2025



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## TAB 3

### Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

#### **Court may appoint receiver**

**243 (1)** Subject to subsection (1.1), on application by a secured creditor, a court may appoint a receiver to do any or all of the following if it considers it to be just or convenient to do so:

- (a) take possession of all or substantially all of the inventory, accounts receivable or other property of an insolvent person or bankrupt that was acquired for or used in relation to a business carried on by the insolvent person or bankrupt;
- (b) exercise any control that the court considers advisable over that property and over the insolvent person's or bankrupt's business; or
- (c) take any other action that the court considers advisable

#### **Restriction on appointment of receiver**

**(1.1)** In the case of an insolvent person in respect of whose property a notice is to be sent under subsection 244(1), the court may not appoint a receiver under subsection (1) before the expiry of 10 days after the day on which the secured creditor sends the notice unless

- (a) the insolvent person consents to an earlier enforcement under subsection 244(2); or
- (b) the court considers it appropriate to appoint a receiver before then.

#### **Definition of *receiver***

**(2)** Subject to subsections (3) and (4), in this Part, ***receiver*** means a person who

- (a) is appointed under subsection (1); or
- (b) is appointed to take or takes possession or control — of all or substantially all of the inventory, accounts receivable or other property of an insolvent person or bankrupt that was acquired for or used in relation to a business carried on by the insolvent person or bankrupt — under
  - (i) an agreement under which property becomes subject to a security (in this Part referred to as a “security agreement”), or
  - (ii) a court order made under another Act of Parliament, or an Act of a legislature of a province, that provides for or authorizes the appointment of a receiver or receiver-manager.

#### **Definition of *receiver* — subsection 248(2)**

**(3)** For the purposes of subsection 248(2), the definition ***receiver*** in subsection (2) is to be read without reference to paragraph (a) or subparagraph (b)(ii).

### **Trustee to be appointed**

(4) Only a trustee may be appointed under subsection (1) or under an agreement or order referred to in paragraph (2)(b).

### **Place of filing**

(5) The application is to be filed in a court having jurisdiction in the judicial district of the locality of the debtor.

### **Orders respecting fees and disbursements**

(6) If a receiver is appointed under subsection (1), the court may make any order respecting the payment of fees and disbursements of the receiver that it considers proper, including one that gives the receiver a charge, ranking ahead of any or all of the secured creditors, over all or part of the property of the insolvent person or bankrupt in respect of the receiver's claim for fees or disbursements, but the court may not make the order unless it is satisfied that the secured creditors who would be materially affected by the order were given reasonable notice and an opportunity to make representations.

### **Meaning of *disbursements***

(7) In subsection (6), *disbursements* does not include payments made in the operation of a business of the insolvent person or bankrupt.

### **Advance notice**

**244 (1)** A secured creditor who intends to enforce a security on all or substantially all of

- (a) the inventory,
- (b) the accounts receivable, or
- (c) the other property

of an insolvent person that was acquired for, or is used in relation to, a business carried on by the insolvent person shall send to that insolvent person, in the prescribed form and manner, a notice of that intention.

### **Period of notice**

(2) Where a notice is required to be sent under subsection (1), the secured creditor shall not enforce the security in respect of which the notice is required until the expiry of ten days after sending that notice, unless the insolvent person consents to an earlier enforcement of the security.

### **No advance consent**

(2.1) For the purposes of subsection (2), consent to earlier enforcement of a security may not be obtained by a secured creditor prior to the sending of the notice referred to in subsection (1).

### **Exception**

- (3)** This section does not apply, or ceases to apply, in respect of a secured creditor
- (a)** whose right to realize or otherwise deal with his security is protected by subsection 69.1(5) or (6); or
  - (b)** in respect of whom a stay under sections 69 to 69.2 has been lifted pursuant to section 69.4.

### **Idem**

- (4)** This section does not apply where there is a receiver in respect of the insolvent person.

### **[Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43](#)**

#### **Injunctions and receivers**

**101** (1) In the Superior Court of Justice, an interlocutory injunction or mandatory order may be granted or a receiver or receiver and manager may be appointed by an interlocutory order, where it appears to a judge of the court to be just or convenient to do so.

- (2) An order under subsection (1) may include such terms as are considered just.

## Tab 4

CITATION: Romspen Investment Corporation v. Atlas Healthcare (Richmond Hill) Ltd. et al,  
2018 ONSC 7382

COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-607303-00CL

COURT FILE NO: CV-18-00609634-00CL

DATE: December 10, 2018

### SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO COMMERCIAL LIST

**IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 243(1) OF THE *BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, C. B-3, AS AMENDED, AND SECTION 101 OF THE *COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT*, R.S.O. 1990 C. C.43, AS AMENDED, AND SECTION 68 OF THE *CONSTRUCTION ACT*, R.S.O. 1990, C. 30, AS AMENDED**

**RE:** ROMSPEN INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Applicant

**AND:**

ATLAS HEALTHCARE (RICHMOND HILL) LTD., ATLAS (RICHMOND HILL) LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ATLAS SHOULDICE HEALTHCARE LTD., ATLAS SHOULDICE HEALTHCARE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, ATLAS HEALTHCARE (BRAMPTON) LTD. and ATLAS BRAMPTON LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Respondents

**AND RE:**

**IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ATLAS SHOULDICE HEALTHCARE LTD., ATLAS HEALTHCARE (BRAMPTON) LTD., ATLAS HEALTHCARE (RICHMOND HILL) LTD., ATLAS HEALTHCARE ASSET MANAGEMENT LTD., ATLAS GLOBAL HEALTHCARE LTD., GRIGORAS DEVELOPMENTS LTD. AND ATLAS INVESTMENTS AND SECURITIES COPORATION

**BEFORE:** Mr. Justice H.J. Wilton-Siegel

**COUNSEL:** *David Preger and Linda Corne*, for Romspen Investment Corporation

*Clifton Prophet*, for Meridian Credit Union Limited

*Marc Wasserman and Mary Paterson*, for the Atlas Respondents and the Applicants under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* application

*Robert Chadwick and Andrea Harmes*, for PointNorth Capital Inc., the Proposed DIP Lender

*Eric Golden*, for Ernst & Young Inc., Proposed Receiver

*Mario Forte*, for KSV Kofman Inc., the Proposed Monitor

**HEARD:** November 27, 2018

### **ENDORSEMENT**

[1] There are two applications before the Court.

[2] In the first application (the "Receivership Application"), Romspen Investment Corporation ("Romspen") applies for the appointment of Ernst & Young Inc. as receiver, manager and construction lien trustee of the undertaking, assets and properties of the Respondent, Atlas Healthcare (Richmond Hill) Ltd., and as receiver and manager of the undertakings, assets and properties of the remaining Respondents including Atlas Healthcare (Richmond Hill) Limited Partnership ("Richmond Hill"), Altas Shouldice Healthcare Limited Partnership ("Shouldice") and Altas Brampton Limited Partnership ("Brampton") (collectively, Richmond Hill, Shouldice and Brampton are referred to as the "Debtors").

[3] In the second application (the "CCAA Application"), certain corporations related to the Debtors including the general partners of the Debtors (collectively, the "CCAA Applicants") request certain relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA") including an initial stay of proceedings in respect of the Debtors and approval of a proposed debtor-in possession facility in respect of Richmond Hill (the "DIP Facility").

[4] On December 3, 2018, the Court advised the parties that the CCAA Application was denied and that the Receivership Application was granted for written reasons to follow. This Endorsement sets out the Court's reasons for these determinations.

### **Factual Background**

#### **The Debtors**

[5] Richmond Hill is the owner of a 5.59 acre parcel of land that fronts on the west side of Brodie Drive and the east side of Leslie Street in Richmond Hill, Ontario and has a municipal address of 25 Brodie Street (the "Richmond Hill Property").

[6] Richmond Hill is currently building a six-story medical office building on the Richmond Hill Property (the "Project"), which is addressed in greater detail below.

[7] Shouldice owns a 22.467 acre parcel of land at 7750 Bayview Avenue (the "Shouldice Property") in Markham, Ontario. The Shouldice Property is currently improved with a three-storey hospital and is occupied by Shouldice Hospital Limited under a lease (the "Hospital Lease").

[8] Atlas owns a 4.59 acre parcel of land at 241 Queen Street East in Brampton, Ontario (the "Brampton Property"). The Brampton Property is currently improved with a single-storey commercial building. The building is currently vacant.

[9] In this Endorsement, the Richmond Hill Property, the Shouldice Property and the Brampton Property are referred to collectively as the "Properties".

### **Financing of the Project**

[10] The Project has been financed by a combination of loans from third-party lenders and equity contributions of Richmond Hill, representing equity contributed principally by the limited partners of Richmond Hill.

[11] At the present time, the principal financing arrangements in place are the following:

- (1) Loans made by Meridian Credit Union Limited ("Meridian") in favour of Richmond Hill (collectively, the "Meridian Loan") secured by a first charge on the Project (the "Meridian Charge") and a first general assignment of rents; and
- (2) A loan made by Romspen in favour of the Debtors together with an outstanding loan acquired by Romspen (collectively, the "Loan"), secured by the Bridging Charge (defined below) and the Romspen Third Charge (defined below), both of which rank behind the Meridian Charge.

These financing arrangements are further described below.

#### ***The Meridian Loan***

[12] Pursuant to a credit agreement dated March 2, 2017 (the "Meridian Credit Arrangement"), Meridian extended a loan in the maximum principal amount of \$59 million to Richmond Hill. In addition, pursuant to an agreement dated July 27, 2018, Meridian extended an interim loan of \$4.4 million to Richmond Hill. As of November 7, 2018, Richmond Hill owed \$43,371,985 under these loan arrangements and certain other facilities extended by Meridian (collectively, the "Meridian Loan"). Interest has not been paid on the Meridian Loan since August 2018 and continues to accrue. As mentioned, the Meridian Loan is secured by a first ranking charge, the Meridian Charge, in the principal amount of \$75 million.

#### ***The Romspen Loan Arrangements***

[13] The Romspen loan arrangements comprise a loan made to the Debtors and an outstanding loan acquired by Romspen, which will be addressed in turn.

#### ***The Romspen Loan***

[14] Pursuant to a financing commitment dated December 11, 2017, as amended by a supplement dated June 10, 2018 (collectively, the "Commitment"), Romspen loaned the amount of \$81.2 million to the Debtors on a joint and several basis (the "Romspen Loan"). The Romspen Loan was evidenced, among other things, by a joint and several promissory note of the

Debtors in the principal amount of \$81.2 million. Of this amount, approximately \$49 million was loaned to Shouldice and \$10 million was loaned to Brampton, in each case to repay all outstanding debt in respect of these properties. In addition, \$19.5 million was loaned to Richmond Hill to partially repay the Bridging Finance Loan (defined below) and \$3,280,500 was loaned to Richmond Hill for use in respect of the Project.

[15] The Romspen Loan is fully advanced. Interest accrues on the Romspen Loan at the rate of 11.45 percent per annum. As of November 1, 2018, according to a schedule derived from the records of Richmond Hill, \$22,382,788 was owed in respect of the monies loaned to Richmond Hill (I note that Romspen calculates a slightly larger amount that is used below but the difference is not material for these proceedings), \$49,324,156 was owed in respect of the monies loaned to Shouldice, and \$10,071,200 was owed in respect of the monies loaned to Brampton, for a total of \$81,778,143 owing on a joint and several basis by the Debtors. Interest has not been paid on the Romspen Loan since August 2018 and is accruing at the rate of slightly less than \$1 million per month.

#### *The Bridging Finance Loan and the Bridging Charge*

[16] The Bridging Charge secures a loan made by Sprott Bridging Income Fund LP to Richmond Hill pursuant to a commitment letter dated February 9, 2016, as amended. This loan was originally in the principal amount of \$15,840,201 but was subsequently increased in stages to \$40,850,000 (the "Bridging Finance Loan"). In this Endorsement, the Romspen Loan and the Bridging Finance Loan are collectively referred to as the "Loan".

[17] Pursuant to the Commitment, Romspen loaned Richmond Hill \$19.5 million, which was used to reduce the outstanding amount of the Bridging Finance Loan. The outstanding balance of the Bridging Finance Loan and the security therefor, including the Bridging Charge, were then acquired by Romspen by way of a transfer upon payment by Romspen to Bridging Finance Inc. of \$19,590,206.47.

[18] At the present time, Romspen says approximately \$25 million is owing in respect of monies advanced to Richmond Hill. There is an issue regarding whether the amount secured by the Bridging Charge is limited to the amount outstanding at the time of the transfer of the Bridging Finance Loan to Romspen plus accrued interest or is the principal amount of the Bridging Charge, being \$40.85 million. However, this is not an issue to be determined in these proceedings. I have proceeded on the basis that the total amount owing by the Debtors jointly and severally secured against the Properties is the amount of the Romspen Loan and therefore the resolution of this issue does not affect the analysis or the determinations made below.

#### *The Romspen Security in the Properties*

[19] As security for the Bridging Finance Loan and the Romspen Loan, Romspen holds the following:

- (3) a second charge on the Project in the principal amount of \$40,850,000, originally given in favour of Bridging Finance Inc. and transferred to Romspen on May 24, 2018 (the “Bridging Charge”);
- (4) a third charge against the Project in the principal amount of \$5 million (the “Romspen Charge”);
- (5) a subordinate general assignment of rents of the Project;
- (6) a first charge over the Shouldice Property in the principal amount of \$81.2 million (the “Shouldice Charge”), together with a general assignment of rents and a specific assignment of the Hospital Lease; and
- (7) a first charge over the Brampton Property in the principal amount of \$81.2 million (the “Brampton Charge”) together with a general assignment of rents in respect of the Brampton Property.

### **Status of the Project**

[20] The Project is over budget. Based on the most recent report dated November 23, 2018 of Pelican Woodcliff Inc. (“Pelican”) (the “Pelican Report”), the Project’s cost consultant, the net project budget has increased by approximately \$39,000,000 from \$83,000,000 to \$122,000,000 (including holdback and reserves).

[21] Meridian stopped funding the Project under the Meridian Loan in early 2018 due to increases in the construction budget. Since then, the Debtors have funded construction costs, including the costs of certain remediation work required as a result of cracks in the slab-on-grade, which are the subject of a dispute between Richmond Hill and Dineen Construction Corporation (“Dineen”), the former general contractor for the Project.

[22] The Project is also behind schedule. Based upon the latest construction schedule, construction was to have been completed on October 1, 2018. However, at the present time, it is only 80 percent complete. Moreover, construction has effectively ceased, apart from a small amount of work that is proceeding as a result of settlement agreements with three lien claimants, which have enabled these trades to continue to work on the Project.

[23] Richmond Hill originally contracted with Dineen as the general contractor for the Project. In August 2018, Dineen terminated its contract, prompted by Dineen’s concern for payment after learning that Meridian was no longer advancing funds to finance the construction and that Meridian had refused to confirm that it would advance the funds necessary to complete the Project.

[24] Between August 3, 2018 and September 28, 2018, Dineen and eleven trades filed construction liens totalling \$16,542,335.75 against the Richmond Hill Property (collectively, the “Liens”). The largest Lien was registered by Dineen. Richmond Hill says Dineen’s Lien claim duplicates the other claims of the trades with respect to the Project. Richmond Hill says that currently approximately \$8 million is required to discharge all the Liens in respect of the Project. Romspen and Meridian acknowledge there is duplication in the Lien claims.

[25] Because the Loan was fully advanced and Meridian had stopped advancing monies under the Meridian Loan, the Debtors, and in particular Richmond Hill, have experienced a liquidity crisis commencing August 2018. Since that time, the Debtors have made serious, but unsuccessful, efforts to enter into a sale or refinancing transaction that would pay out Romspen and Meridian.

[26] Richmond Hill has selected a different general contractor, Greenferd Construction Inc. (“Greenferd”), to manage the interior works to make the Project suitable for the future tenants, referred to as the “Fit-Out Works”. Richmond Hill has recently also engaged Greenferd to take over the role of general contractor for the remaining construction of the Project.

[27] Richmond Hill says that it now expects substantial completion of the Project to occur during May 2019. In view of the construction delay, Richmond Hill has sought and obtained signed acknowledgements regarding the new target occupancy date from future tenants who have contracted for 72 percent of the gross leasable space in the Project and who represent 76 percent of the total projected rent roll. These acknowledgements have provisions that permit Richmond Hill to extend the commitments of these tenants to May 30, 2018.

[28] Meridian’s consultant on the Project, Glynn Group Incorporated (“Glynn”), has reviewed the Pelican Report and has made a number of comments, including the following.

[29] First, Glynn agrees with Pelican that construction of the Project will only be back up and running in a productive manner by the middle of January 2019. Second, given the volume of construction remaining, the Project requires “extremely intensive” supervisory, scheduling and management oversight” to achieve the timelines contemplated by Pelican and the Debtors. Third, the selection of a new general contractor/construction manager is “pivotal” to the success of the Project going forward. Fourth, the scenario of a new general contractor/construction manager working with the existing trades is the best scenario and is contemplated by the budget reviewed by Pelican. However, Pelican was also of the opinion that it may not be possible to convince these trades to return to the Project given the recent history of non-payment and the existence of the Liens.

#### **Demands under the Loan and the Meridian Loan**

[30] The registration of the Liens and the failure of the Debtors (and the other guarantors under the Loan) to remove the Liens from title to the Richmond Hill Property constitutes a default under the Commitment under and each of the Meridian Charge, the Romspen Charge, the Shouldice Charge, the Brampton Charge and the Bridging Charge (collectively, the “Charges”).

[31] The existence of the Liens on the Richmond Hill Property also constitutes a serious material adverse change under the Loan. Section 16.16 of the Commitment provides that if, in the opinion of Romspen, an adverse material change occurs in respect of any of the Debtors, its business, a charged property or Romspen’s security, the whole balance of the Loan becomes immediately due and payable and becomes enforceable. The Bridging Finance Loan and the Meridian Credit Agreement contain similar provisions.

[32] In addition, the failure to pay municipal taxes when due also constitutes a default under the Commitment and the Charges. It is understood that tax arrears are owing in respect of each of the Properties and that further arrears are being incurred.

[33] On September 12, 2018, Romspen made demand on the Debtors (among others) and issued notices pursuant to s. 244 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (the "BIA"). On November 12, 2018, Meridian also made demand on Richmond Hill, among others, and issued similar notices under s. 244 of the BIA. The Debtors do not deny that they are in default under the Commitment, the Bridging Finance Loan, the Meridian Loan and the Charges.

[34] The Debtors also do not dispute that each Charge held by Romspen and Meridian in respect of the Properties provides for the appointment of a receiver in the event of default under the Loan and the Meridian Loan. The Romspen Charge also expressly contemplates the appointment of a construction lien trustee under the *Construction Act*, R.S.O. 1990, C. 30 (the "CA") in the event of default.

### **The Receivership Application**

[35] As mentioned, in the Receivership Application, Romspen seeks the appointment of a receiver over the properties and assets of Richmond Hill having the necessary powers to engage third parties to complete the construction of the Project. Romspen also seeks the appointment of a receiver over the assets of Shouldice and Brampton.

[36] The receivership order sought by Romspen included the power to sell the assets of each of the Debtors. However, the principal purpose of the Romspen application in respect of Richmond Hill is the appointment of a receiver to supervise the completion of construction of the Project. Romspen also says the principal purpose of the appointment of a receiver over the assets of Shouldice and Brampton is to ensure that the priority of funds advanced under the proposed Receivership Financing (defined below) is preserved in respect of these Properties as well as the Richmond Hill Property. Accordingly, Romspen has indicated that it is prepared to exclude the power of sale in respect of the Properties from any order that the Court may grant.

[37] Romspen has filed a report of Ernst & Young Inc., the proposed receiver (the "Proposed Receiver"), which sets out its proposed course of action. The Proposed Receiver states that it intends to engage Elm Development Corp. as the construction manager for the Project.

[38] Meridian supports the Receivership Application of Romspen and has committed to the Receivership Financing (defined below) with Romspen. In this Endorsement, the term "Receivership Applicants" refers to Romspen and Meridian in the circumstances in which they join in making the same submissions in these proceedings.

### **The Receivership Financing**

[39] Romspen and Meridian have provided the Court with a signed term sheet for a joint financing in the amount of \$35 million to fund the proposed receivership (the "Receivership Facility"). The following are the principal terms of this Facility.

[40] The principal amount of the Facility of \$35 million is available in two tranches – a tranche of \$15 million to be provided by Romspen (the “Romspen Tranche”) and a tranche of \$20 million to be provided by Meridian (the “Meridian Tranche”). The Meridian Tranche is to be available only after specified construction work described in a schedule to the Pelican Report (although the term sheet refers to a prior Pelican report dated October 21, 2018) is completed, in which event the loan/value covenant under the Meridian Credit Agreement would be brought into compliance permitting further advances under that Agreement.

[41] The Receivership Facility would have a one-year term, and would bear interest at a rate of 15 percent under the Romspen Tranche and at the rate provided for under the Meridian Credit Agreement for the Meridian Tranche. The Receivership Applicants say this would result in a blended rate of approximately nine percent.

[42] Advances under the Romspen Tranche of the Receivership Facility are to be secured by a charge ranking behind the Meridian Charge but ahead of all other charges on the Properties, including the Liens. Advances under the Meridian Tranche are to be secured on the Richmond Hill Property in priority to all other charges on that Property.

[43] The Receivership Facility contemplates fees of three percent of the maximum amount of the Romspen Tranche to Romspen and of \$170,000 to Meridian.

### **The CCAA Application**

[44] In addition to opposing the Receivership Application, the CCAA Applicants, which effectively includes the Debtors, have brought an application for certain relief under the CCAA, including an initial stay of proceedings and the appointment of KSV Kofman Inc. as the Monitor in respect of the proposed proceedings. The order sought also includes approvals of the DIP Facility and related charge (the “DIP Charge”), of a financial advisor agreement dated October 19, 2018 between Atlas Global Healthcare Ltd., one of the CCAA Applicants, and FTI Capital Advisors – Canada ULC (“FTI”) and a related charge (the “FTI Charge”), of a directors’ and officers’ charge in the aggregate amount of \$500,000, and of an administration charge in the aggregate amount of \$1.5 million.

### **The DIP Facility**

[45] In the CCAA Application, the CCAA Applicants have included a signed term sheet dated as of November 26, 2018 respecting the DIP Facility between PointNorth Capital (PNG) LP and PointNorth Capital (O) LP (collectively, “PointNorth”), as lenders on behalf of certain funds and accounts (collectively “PointNorth”), on the one hand, and each of the CCAA Applicants, on the other. The following sets out the principal terms of the DIP Facility.

[46] The DIP Facility is a non-revolving facility that accrues interest at 15 percent per annum compounded monthly and has a term of one year, subject to earlier termination under certain circumstances. The total availability under the DIP Facility is \$50 million to be funded in two equal tranches – the first upon the issuance of the initial order sought under the CCAA including approval of the DIP Facility and the second on or about February 1, 2019. The DIP Facility also includes provision for an additional loan of up to \$2,830,000 to cover overrun construction costs (the “Bulge Facility”).

[47] The DIP Loan requires payment of a commitment fee of \$750,000, a monthly administration fee of \$50,000 and an early exit payment fee on repayment of any portion of the DIP Facility to top up aggregate interest payments to \$6,875,000.

[48] The DIP Facility contemplates the following use of proceeds: (1) to pay advisory, consultant and legal fees of the lenders, the CCAA Applicants and the Monitor; (2) to pay interest, fees and other amounts owing under the DIP Facility; (3) to fund the working capital requirements of Richmond Hill and property taxes and insurance of the other Debtors during the CCAA proceedings; and (4) to fund the costs to complete the Project in accordance with the budget for the Project, estimated to be \$28.261 million plus certain amounts to address certain Lien claims.

[49] The DIP Facility contemplates a charge over all the property and assets of the CCAA Applicants, including the Richmond Hill Property, ranking prior to all other charges other than the Meridian Charge. Accordingly, the DIP Facility requires a charge ranking behind the security in favour of Meridian on the Richmond Hill Property but ahead of the security in favour of Romspen on each of the Properties. Further, the DIP Facility contemplates subordinate charges over a fourth property (the "Mississauga Property") that is not subject to any security in favour of either Meridian or Romspen.

#### **Applicable Law**

[50] The appointment of a receiver and manager is governed by s. 43 of the BIA and section 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, both of which provide that the Court may appoint a receiver where it is "just or convenient" to do so. Although s. 68 of the CA does not specify that the requirement for the appointment of a construction lien trustee is satisfaction of the "just or convenient" test, Ontario courts have relied on this test in making such an appointment: see, for example, *WestLB AG, Toronto Branch v. Rosseau Resort Developments Inc.*, 2009 CanLII 31188 (Ont. S.C.).

[51] It is trite law that, in considering whether to appoint a receiver, a court should have regard to all the circumstances of the case but in particular to the nature of the property and the rights and interests of the affected parties in relation thereto: see, for example, *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek* (1996), 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274 (Ont. C.J. (Gen. Div.)), at para. 11.

[52] The granting of a stay of proceedings on an initial application under s. 11.02(1) of the CCAA requires the applicant demonstrate that it is a "debtor company" as defined in s. 2(1) of the CCAA and that circumstances exist that make the order appropriate.

[53] For this purpose, I adopt the following description of the purpose of the CCAA in *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.), at p. 88:

The purpose of the C.C.A.A. is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business. ... When a company has recourse to the C.C.A.A., the

Court is called upon to play a kind of supervisory role to preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where a compromise or arrangement is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure.

[54] There is no dispute that each of the CCAA Applicants are debtor companies for the purposes of the CCAA. Further, each of the Debtors is insolvent in that, regardless of the values of the Richmond Hill Property on completion of the Project, and of the Shouldice Property after redevelopment of that Property, they are currently unable to meet their respective obligations as they fall due.

[55] In the present case, because the CCAA Application also requires approval of the DIP Facility at this time, the provisions of s. 11.2 of the CCAA governing the approval of any charge to secure debtor-in-possession financing, while not technically applicable unless the CCAA Application is granted, also inform the determinations made in this Endorsement. In this regard, s. 11.2(4) provides that, among other things, in deciding whether to approve such a charge, a court is to consider the following factors:

- (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under the CCAA;
- (b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
- (c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
- (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;
- (e) the nature and value of the company's property;
- (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
- (g) the monitor's report, if any.

### **Analysis and Conclusions**

[56] There is no obvious priority of consideration of the Receivership Application and the CCAA Application. Moreover, each must be judged independently on its own merits. It is at least theoretically possible that each application could be denied. However, as a practical matter, the parties require that the Court grant the relief sought in one of the applications in order that construction of the Project can restart under the supervision of either a court-appointed receiver or Richmond Hill as a debtor-in-possession. Further, the considerations respecting the merits of each application are broadly similar. Accordingly, I propose to address the considerations raised by the parties first and then to set out my determinations regarding the applications.

[57] The considerations raised by the parties fall broadly into four categories – operational issues, the nature of the property involved, the respective rights and interests of the parties and the respective costs of the prospective proceedings. I will deal with each of these considerations in turn.

### **Operational Issues Pertaining to the Competing Applications**

[58] The CCAA Applicants have raised two considerations that they urge the Court to take into account pertaining to the manner in which it is proposed to conduct the remaining construction of the Project: (1) the comparative feasibility of the respective financial plans of the parties; and (2) the comparative feasibility of the respective construction plans of the parties. I will address each of these considerations separately before addressing whether one of the operational plans is demonstrably superior to the other.

### ***The Competing Financial Plans***

[59] The CCAA Applicants argue that their financial plan is more realistic than the Romspen receivership plan, which they suggest is unrealistic in the sense of not feasible.

[60] The financial plan of the CCAA Applicants contemplates an availability of \$50 million under the DIP Facility. In the current cash flows provided to the Court, which also form the budget for the purpose of the DIP Facility, Richmond Hill would have a cushion of approximately \$5 million to cover cost overruns. In addition, the DIP Facility provides for the possibility of the Bulge Facility to cover further cost overruns.

[61] The financial plan of the proposed receivership is based on the Receivership Facility. It is limited to \$35 million, of which the Meridian Tranche of \$20 million is available only if the hard construction costs do not materially exceed those contemplated in a schedule to the Pelican Report. The Receivership Facility also does not have any significant amount of cushion for cost overruns. However, each of Romspen and Meridian are of the view that these costs are achievable and that they will deal with any unanticipated cost overruns. They are also of the view that the budget of the CCAA Applicants includes certain costs in amounts that are either unnecessary or larger than necessary.

[62] The principal differences between the two plans pertain to lower interest costs and professional fees of the Receivership Financing as well as a different view of the amounts required to pay the Lien claimants and a larger cushion for contingencies under the DIP Facility.

[63] While there is some benefit in the greater flexibility provided by the DIP Facility, I am not persuaded that, on balance, the financial plan for the receivership is unrealistic, as the CCAA Applicants suggest. It is consistent with the estimate of capital costs to completion of Pelican, Richmond Hill's own quantity surveyor, which the CCAA Applicants also use in their budget. Those capital costs have also been reviewed and approved by Meridian's quantity surveyor. Further, as Romspen acknowledges, the terms of the Receivership Financing, as well as the limited scope of the proposed receivership order in respect of Shouldice and Brampton, effectively require Romspen to fund any cost overruns provided they will translate into increased equity in the Project. In addition, as mentioned, a principal difference between the two plans is a more conservative estimate of certain payments (i.e. involving larger payments) in the financial

plan of the CCAA Applicants. It is not possible to estimate these latter costs with any degree of certainty at the present time.

[64] Based on the foregoing assessment of the considerations raised by the parties, I conclude that the evidence before the Court does not establish that the financing plan of the Receivership Applicants is unrealistic in the sense that it is not feasible or that the financing plan of the CCAA Applicants is materially better than the plan of the Receivership Applicants.

### *The Competing Construction Plans*

[65] The CCAA Applicants also argue that their construction plan is more reliable than that of the proposed receivership. In particular, the CCAA Applicants argue that they are better placed to get the construction restarted because of their prior familiarity with the construction plan and schedule, as well as their relationship with the trades. Romspen and Meridian say that Elm is experienced in workout construction projects and is therefore more than capable of restarting the Project in a reasonable time.

[66] I do not think that the record provides a basis for preferring one construction plan over the other for the following reasons.

[67] First, while Richmond Hill has more experience of, involvement in, and knowledge of, the Project, this cuts both ways. Under its supervision, the capital costs of the Project have increased very significantly. While Richmond Hill disputes the \$38 or \$39 million figure of Pelican, it acknowledges at least \$32 million in cost overruns. There are, therefore, valid grounds for concern regarding the ability of Richmond Hill's management to control construction costs. In addition, under Richmond Hill's supervision, the trades previously working on the Project have ceased working and registered construction liens. A decision will have to be made on an individual trade basis whether to settle with, or to replace, the trade. This may be affected in part by the state of the current relationship between Richmond Hill and each of the affected trades.

[68] Second, Richmond Hill has been forced to engage a new general contractor for the construction, Greenferd. Both Greenferd and Elm appear to have a similar degree of familiarity with the Project and a similar challenge of "getting up to speed". I cannot find that Elm is any more of a risk than Greenferd on the record before the Court.

[69] Third, the more aggressive construction schedule proposed by Richmond Hill in the affidavit of Peter Grigoras, sworn November 14, 2018 (the "Grigoras Affidavit"), is not consistent with the opinion of Pelican, its own quantity surveyor. As noted above, Pelican is of the view that construction would restart in early January and that substantial performance would not be achieved until late June 2019. I see no basis for concluding that there will be no "ramp-up" time under a CCAA proceeding, as the CCAA Applicants suggest.

[70] Fourth, the CCAA Applicants say the Court should be mindful of the specialized nature of the Project as a hospital and the fact that Richmond Hill has engaged specialized employees and consultants to address the complicated issues associated with construction of such a building. However, to the extent that Richmond Hill has engaged any such individuals as employees or consultants, a receiver would also be in a position to engage them to receive the benefit of their

expertise. The real significance of this consideration, if any, lies in the increased costs that would be incurred beyond those currently contemplated by the Receivership Facility but are apparently included in the budget used for the DIP Facility.

[71] Fifth, the CCAA Applicants also suggest that the involvement of OMERS, as an investor in PointNorth, and of Dream Alternatives Lending Services LP, as a participant in the DIP Facility, is a significant advantage. They suggest that the expertise of these organizations will translate into better cost administration and the availability of construction expertise. While such involvement would be desirable, there is nothing to demonstrate that such benefits will accrue to the Project. Moreover, each of PointNorth and Romspen has expertise in the administration of construction projects in a workout situation and an incentive to require careful oversight.

[72] Lastly, while I agree that, in certain circumstances, a debtor-in-possession restructuring may impart greater confidence in the financial stability of the debtor than a receivership, I am not persuaded that this is an important consideration in the present case. The liquidity problems of Richmond Hill have been transparent to all of the trades working on the Project for some time and to the future tenants. It is not clear that a CCAA proceeding would restore confidence in Richmond Hill if the same management continued to be involved with the Project, even with a new general contractor.

#### ***Conclusion Regarding Operational Issues Pertaining to the Competing Applications***

[73] Each of the proposed plans for completing the Project of the Receivership Applicants and the CCAA Applicants carries its own risks. I have considered whether, when viewed in their entirety, the construction and financing plans of one of these parties is materially superior to the other, or more credible than the other, such that this should be a consideration to be taken into account in the Court's determination. Given the evidence before the Court, I am not persuaded, however, that the plan of either the CCAA Applicants or the Receivership Applicants is materially superior to, or more credible than, the other. In particular, I cannot conclude that either the CCAA Applicants' plan or the Receivership Applicants' plan is more likely to achieve construction completion on time and on budget. Given the number of variables involved, any such determination would be highly speculative at this time. Nor do I think that the CCAA Applicants have demonstrated that the Receivership Application, if granted, will result in the Project failing to be completed, as the CCAA Applicants suggest. Accordingly, I do not consider the operational features of the plans of the parties to be a significant consideration weighing in favour of either the CCAA Application or the Receivership Application.

#### **The Nature of the Property**

[74] An important consideration in this proceeding is the nature of the property at issue.

[75] The Receivership Applicants say that each of the Debtors is a single-project real estate development company. Romspen says that courts have generally held that there is no principled basis for granting a stay under the CCAA to prevent real estate lenders from enforcing their security. Meridian submits that courts will generally refuse to grant a stay where CCAA protection would place the value of the security of secured creditors at risk. Both rely on the

decisions in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.*, 2008 BCCA 327, 83 B.C.L.R. (4th) 214 and in *Dondeb Inc. (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 6087, 97 C.B.R. (5th) 264.

[76] In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments*, Tysoe J.A. stated the following at para. 36:

Although the CCAA can apply to companies whose sole business is a single land development as long as the requirements set out in the CCAA are met, it may be that, in view of the nature of its business and financing arrangements, such companies would have difficulty proposing an arrangement or compromise that was more advantageous than the remedies available to its creditors. The priorities of the security against the land development are often straightforward, and there may be little incentive for the creditors having senior priority to agree to an arrangement or compromise that involves money being paid to more junior creditors before the senior creditors are paid in full. If the developer is insolvent and not able to complete the development without further funding, the secured creditors may feel that they will be in a better position by exercising their remedies rather than by letting the developer remain in control of the failed development while attempting to rescue it by means of obtaining refinancing, capital injection by a new partner or DIP financing.

[77] In *Dondeb Inc.*, after referring to the above statement of Tysoe J.A., C. Campbell J. went on to refer with approval to the following comments of Kent J. in *Octagon Properties Group Ltd. (Re)*, 2009 ABQB 500, 486 A.R. 296, at para. 17:

This is not a case where it is appropriate to grant relief under the CCAA. First, I accept the position of the majority of first mortgagees who say that it is highly unlikely that any compromise or arrangement proposed by Octagon would be acceptable to them. That position makes sense given the fact that if they are permitted to proceed with foreclosure procedures and taking into account the current estimates of value, for most mortgagees on most of their properties they will emerge reasonably unscathed. There is no incentive for them to agree to a compromise. On the other hand if I granted CCAA relief, it would be these same mortgagees who would be paying the cost to permit Octagon to buy some time. Second, there is no other reason for CCAA relief such as the existence of a large number of employees or significant unsecured debt in relation to the secured debt. I balance those reasons against the fact that even if the first mortgagees commence or continue in their foreclosure proceedings that process is also supervised by the court and to the extent that Octagon has reasonable arguments to obtain relief under the foreclosure process, it will likely obtain that relief.

[78] The CCAA Applicants do not deny this line of cases but suggest that it is not applicable in the present circumstances. They suggest that the circumstances are much closer to the circumstances in *Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Limited Partnership*, 2009 BCCA 319, 96 B.C.L.R. (4th) 77 and *Pacific Shores Resort & Spa Ltd. (Re)*, 2011 BCSC 1775, in which courts ordered a stay under the CCAA in preference to the appointment of a receiver.

[79] In *Forest & Marine Financial Corp.*, at para. 26, Newbury J.A. distinguished the circumstances from those in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments* as follows:

In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself, which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act - to preserve the status quo while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned - will be furthered by granting a stay so that the means contemplated by the Act - a compromise or arrangement - can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary. If the Partnership is ultimately able to arrange a refinancing in respect of which creditors need not compromise their rights, so much the better. At this point, however, it seems more likely a compromise will be necessary and the Partnership must move promptly to explore all realistic restructuring alternatives.

[80] The same analysis was applied by Fitzpatrick J. in *Pacific Shores Resort & Spa Ltd.*, at para. 39:

I am of the view that, similar to the facts under consideration in *Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Limited Partnership*, 2009 BCCA 319 at para. 26, 273 B.C.A.C. 271, this is a situation where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of the parties. The CCAA proceedings have only begun, and I have no doubt that any plan will evolve over time given the usual negotiations that one would expect to occur between the petitioners and the major stakeholders while the stay is in place.

[81] The CCAA Applicants suggest that Richmond Hill in particular should be treated as a business because it has approximately 20 employees and consultants and because it has contracted with approximately 20 future tenants. They also suggest that the relationships among the CCAA Applicants and the Debtors are complex with the result that a CCAA proceeding is more appropriate.

[82] I do not think that any of the Debtors can properly be characterized as a business in the sense contemplated in the cases relied upon by the CCAA Applicants. There is no demonstrated ongoing business of any of the Debtors. There are only a limited number of employees and consultants of Richmond Hill and these individuals are employed solely for the purpose of building the Project. The fact that approximately 20 entities have executed leases for space in the Project when it is completed also does not establish the existence of a business at the present time. Nor have the CCAA Applicants demonstrated that the relationship between themselves is sufficiently complex to require a CCAA proceeding to properly identify the respective stakeholder interests in the debtor companies and ensure fair treatment of such interests.

[83] More generally, the circumstances in the cases relied upon by the CCAA Applicants are very different from the present circumstances in a number of significant respects. In *Forest & Marine Financial*, the debtor companies were engaged in a very different business from real estate development – that of providing financing and advisory services. The assets of the debtor companies comprised a loan portfolio of many types of assets as well as an office building and the liabilities included both secured debt and “investment receipts” issued to the public. In *Pacific Shores Resort & Spa*, the debtor companies employed approximately 250 persons and were in the business of selling vacation ownership products and deeded ownership products, and the management of such interests, including the management of several resorts. Moreover, and significantly, in both cases, the court concluded that the secured creditors were well covered by the equity in the debtor companies. In my view, therefore, the present circumstances are much closer to those in *Dondeb* and *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments* than they are to the circumstances in *Forest & Marine Financial* and *Pacific Shores Resort & Spa*.

[84] The foregoing analysis suggests that there are no features of the business of the Debtors, or of the Properties, that render a CCAA proceeding necessary, or more appropriate than a receivership proceeding, to address the current liquidity difficulties of the Debtors and the need to complete the Project with an additional injection of funds from third parties. The proposed receivership proceeding and the proposed CCAA proceeding should each accomplish the objective of completion of construction of the Project. However, the case law suggests that, in similar circumstances, particularly where the security coverage of secured creditors is in question, courts have given effect to the rights of secured creditors by granting a receivership order. This consideration weighs in favour of a receivership order in the present circumstances. To be clear, however, I think that the judicial preference for a receivership over a CCAA proceeding in the circumstances of a single-project real estate development corporation is not so much a free-standing rule, as Romspen suggests, as it is the outcome of a consideration of the other factors discussed below.

**Legal Rights and Interests of Meridian and Romspen**

[85] Meridian and Romspen submit that where the contract between a lender and a borrower provides for the appointment of a receiver in the event of a default, a court should not ordinarily interfere. In short, they argue that the Court should give effect to their contractual rights.

[86] As mentioned, the Court is required to assess whether the appointment of a receiver is “just or convenient” having regard to all of the circumstances. In this context, I do not think that the rights of secured creditors who choose to seek the benefits of a court-appointed receiver over a privately-appointed receiver are as unqualified as Romspen suggests. Nevertheless, the legal rights of Meridian and Romspen are an important consideration in making a determination regarding the appropriateness of relief under the CCAA as well as the application of the “just or convenient” test for the appointment of a receiver. In this regard, two considerations are of particular significance.

***The Security Position of Meridian and Romspen***

[87] First, there is a real possibility that the consequence of the priority to be afforded the DIP Charge, which is a condition of any CCAA proceeding, would be to diminish the security of Romspen and, to a lesser extent, of Meridian. For clarity, it should be noted, however, that the security of these creditors will only be “primed” as a practical matter to the extent that the monies advanced under the DIP Facility exceed the monies that would otherwise be advanced under the Receivership Financing, given that prior-ranking construction financing is required under each plan to complete the Project.

[88] The CCAA Applicants argue that, on the basis of their evidence, both Romspen and Meridian are fully secured with the result that there is no practical significance to this concern. I agree that, given the terms of the DIP Facility, and subject to the resolution of one issue acknowledged by counsel for PointNorth, it is unlikely that Meridian would be adversely affected by the imposition of that Facility in priority to the Meridian Loan. However, the situation in respect of Romspen is not as clear. This requires a consideration of the evidence in the record.

[89] The CCAA Applicants have provided appraisals of the Properties that they say demonstrate that Romspen is very well secured. Conversely, Romspen has provided internal valuations for the Properties that place Romspen’s security “on the cusp”, in that they suggest that the aggregate value of the equity in the Shouldice Property, the Brampton Property and the completed Project, after deduction of the amount of the Meridian Loan and the DIP Facility, would be no greater than the outstanding amount of the Loan at the present time and could be materially less than such amount. Romspen also notes that, given the interest rate under the Loan, interest continues to accrue at the rate of slightly less than \$1 million per month eroding any existing equity. Accordingly, under these valuations, Romspen could suffer a deficiency under a CCAA proceeding using its estimate of the costs of such a proceeding. On the other hand, using more optimistic assumptions, the same valuation models would provide a cushion of coverage for Romspen.

[90] I do not think that the appraisals provided by the CCAA Applicants are sufficiently reliable that the Court can rely on them on a balance of probabilities standard for the following reasons.

[91] With respect to the Project, the appraisal of the CCAA Applicants was conducted on a "fully built" basis. It also assumes 100 percent occupancy at certain projected rental rates. While Richmond Hill has contracted for a large portion of the rental space, there is a real risk until the Project is fully completed that the projected rental stream will not be achieved for a number of reasons. Accordingly, it logically follows that the value of the Project at the present time must be discounted from this appraisal value to reflect such risks. With respect to the Shouldice Property, the appraisal of the CCAA Applicants is based on the assumption that the Shouldice Property can be rezoned for the development contemplated in the appraisal. There is, however, no evidence on the feasibility of such development. Accordingly, neither of these appraisals provides a reliable valuation of these Properties at the present time.

[92] On the other hand, the internal valuations of Romspen make certain assumptions regarding occupancy rates and an appropriate capitalization rate that are likely to be conservative given Romspen's status as a subordinated lender to the Debtors. The sensitivity analysis provided by Romspen demonstrates a range of values as these assumptions are varied that would result in Romspen's security position falling between a material deficiency and a moderate excess of coverage. In the absence of any basis for determining the appropriate assumptions, it is also not possible to rely on these internal valuations.

[93] It is therefore necessary to seek other objective evidence regarding a realistic range of values for the Project.

[94] In this case, the best objective evidence is PointNorth's position, as the lender under the DIP Facility. If PointNorth accepted the Debtor's estimate of value, it would not have required that the DIP Charge prime the Romspen security, much less required that the CCAA Applicants provide the additional security on the Mississauga Property. Given PointNorth's requirement of these terms of the DIP Facility, I think it is a fair inference that PointNorth does not share the Debtor's confidence in the value of the Properties.

[95] In addition, the inability of the Debtors to obtain financing at the indicative values in the term sheets set out in the Grigoras Affidavit is further evidence that the appraisal values put forward by the CCAA Applicants are not reliable indicators of the current values of the Properties. In this respect, the indicative term sheet of PointNorth attached to that Affidavit is of particular relevance.

[96] Similarly, the failure of a proposed sale of the Shouldice Property on the terms, and at the value, set out in the Grigoras Affidavit due to the purchaser's failure to satisfy the financing condition is also evidence that the value ascribed to that Property by the CCAA Applicants is not credible.

[97] The foregoing evidence does not, however, establish a credible value or range of values for the Richmond Hill Property or the Shouldice Property. In these circumstances, I think the Court can find no more than that the equity in the Properties lies somewhere between the

Romspen internal values and values that are materially less than the aggregate value ascribed to them by the Debtors.

[98] The Court must therefore proceed on the basis that there is at least a reasonable possibility that the DIP Facility would adversely affect the Romspen security position. There is, therefore, a real possibility that, under the proposed CCAA proceedings, the Debtors would be “playing with Romspen’s money” by virtue of the terms of the DIP Facility, as Romspen suggests. In other words, as in *Octagon Properties Group*, under the proposed CCAA proceedings, Romspen would be paying the cost to permit the Debtors to buy some time. This is also a consideration that weighs in favour of a receivership.

[99] I note, as well, that there is an inherent check and balance on the foregoing value assessment in the CCAA Applicants’ favour. The grant of the requested receivership order would not prevent the CCAA Applicants from continuing to market the Properties with a view to a sale or refinancing transaction that would repay Meridian and Romspen. If the values of the Properties do in fact approach the values suggested by the CCAA Applicants, it should be possible to conclude such a transaction and, thereby, to retain the remaining equity in the Properties for the benefit of the subordinated lenders and equity holders.

#### ***The Contractual Rights of Meridian and Romspen***

[100] Second, the effect of a CCAA proceeding would be to deprive Meridian and Romspen of the right to cause a change in the management of the Project in the very circumstances in which their security contemplates such a right. The Receivership Applicants have lost faith in the Debtors’ management and an acknowledged default has occurred. Meridian and Romspen have bargained for the right to have a receiver take over control of, and to complete, the construction of the Project in these circumstances. There must be a good reason to deprive them of that right.

[101] In the present circumstances, however, this right has a particular significance because oversight and control of the construction costs is likely to impact the value of Romspen’s security and, in an extreme case, of Meridian’s security. A court-appointed receiver must justify its actions to the court and thereby to the creditors. It is exposed to potential liability if it is grossly negligent in the performance of its duties. Accordingly, secured creditors would reasonably expect to have more input into a receiver’s actions than they would into the actions of the Debtors’ management in a CCAA proceeding. While this might not be significant in a status quo situation, it is an important consideration in the present circumstances in which significant construction activity must take place, and significant additional debt must be incurred, to complete the Project.

[102] Accordingly, I conclude that the assertion by the Receivership Applicants of their contractual rights in the present circumstances, as well as their loss of faith in the management of the Debtors, must be important considerations for the Court.

#### **The Interests of the Other Stakeholders in the Project**

[103] Based on the foregoing, the proposed CCAA proceedings would have the two adverse or potentially adverse effects on the Receivership Applicants described above. The CCAA Applicants argue, however, that any such prejudice to the Receivership Applicants is more than

offset by the operational benefits of a CCAA proceeding and the benefits to the other stakeholders in the Project.

[104] I have dealt with the alleged operational benefits of the proposed CCAA proceeding above. I have concluded that the CCAA Applicants have not established that there are material operational benefits that make a CCAA proceeding superior to a receivership proceeding. This is therefore not a factor to be taken into consideration.

[105] The position of the CCAA Applicants that there are other stakeholders who will benefit from a CCAA proceeding and whose interests counterbalance the interests of the Receivership Applicants raises an important issue in these applications. Such stakeholders fall into two categories – future tenants and subordinate creditors and equity owners.

[106] The future tenants are critical to the success of the Project. It is of fundamental importance that the tenancy agreements in place continue and that any unrented space be rented as soon as possible. However, I am not persuaded that the future tenants who have contracted with Richmond Hill are more likely to favour a CCAA proceeding over a receivership. There is no evidence to this effect in the record. The more likely position is that the future tenants are more concerned with satisfaction that the Project, including the Fit-Out Works in respect of their space, will be completed in accordance with the timelines contemplated. In this respect, I think the future tenants are likely to be neutral as between a receivership or CCAA proceedings.

[107] The subordinated creditors of the Project comprise the trade creditors and certain unsecured lenders to the Project. The former include the Lien claimants whose priority has been established and any future trade creditors who will need to be kept current in order to complete the Project. The interests of these parties pertain to operational issues that are not affected by the nature of the proceeding that results in a restart of construction of the Project.

[108] On the other hand, the unsecured creditors and the equity holders in the Project rank junior to Meridian and Romspen. A CCAA proceeding, which entails prejudice or potential prejudice to senior ranking creditors in favour of junior ranking creditors and equity holders can only be justified, if ever, on the basis of larger societal interests.

[109] Meridian and Romspen submit that, as single-project real estate development companies, the insolvency of the Debtors, and in particular of Richmond Hill, does not raise any such interests. They rely on the decisions in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments* and *Dondeb*, and in particular on the statements in those decisions cited above. Three considerations emerge from the case law set out above which are important in the present circumstances.

[110] First, where there is no business but rather a single-project real estate development company having mortgage lenders, it is not realistic to contemplate the possibility of a plan of compromise or arrangement under the CCAA that gives Meridian and Romspen less than a full payout of their indebtedness from the proceeds of any sale or a refinancing. In particular, there can be no justification for transferring value from Meridian and Romspen to more junior creditors or the equity holders.

[111] Second, for the same reason, there is no basis on which subordination of the priority position of Meridian and Romspen to that of a DIP Lender can be justified beyond the

construction costs contemplated by the financing plans of the parties to the extent such costs translate into equity in the Project and therefore do not diminish the security of these creditors.

[112] Third, for the foregoing reasons, it is questionable whether the CCAA proceedings contemplated by the CCAA Application can be said to further the purpose of the CCAA as set out above for the following reasons.

[113] In the present case, the CCAA is not being proposed with a view to “stabilizing” the present circumstances of the Debtors and allowing the Debtors the benefit of the status quo with a view to putting a restructuring plan to the stakeholders. There are two elements to this conclusion.

[114] First, it is not meaningful to talk of the maintenance of the status quo for the reason that, as discussed above, construction of the Project, being the only activity of Richmond Hill, is currently almost completely shut down. The Court is not being asked to grant relief to maintain that status quo. It is being asked to determine which of the two legal procedures – a receivership or a CCAA proceeding – should be ordered with a view to furthering a resumption of the construction of the Project under a new construction general contractor. Moreover, while the DIP Facility provides for some working capital, the DIP Facility is a non-revolving facility whose predominant purpose is to provide construction financing in a material amount which is necessary to permit construction to restart. In effect, the CCAA Applicants ask the Court to impose a third construction lender on the Project in priority to the existing lenders. This is beyond the usual nature and purpose of a DIP loan for working capital purposes. It underscores the fact that mere “stabilization” of the alleged business of the Debtors would serve no useful purpose. In short, the CCAA Applicants do not seek relief under the CCAA for the purpose of maintaining the status quo, or for “stabilizing” the situation, in the sense in which those terms are generally understood in the context of CCAA proceedings.

[115] Second, the CCAA Applicants do not contemplate a plan of compromise or arrangement as understood for the purposes of the CCAA for the reason that, as mentioned, Meridian and Romspen cannot be compelled to accept less than a complete payout of the Meridian Loan and the Loan, respectively, out of the proceeds of a sale or a refinancing. The “plan” of the CCAA Applicants is to seek to repay Meridian and Romspen out of the proceeds of a future sale or refinancing, if possible, after completion of the Project.

[116] Fundamentally, the purpose of the CCAA Application is not to restructure the business of the Debtors with a view to continuing their business but rather to maintain control of the Project by a Court-ordered imposition of new construction financing in the hope of realizing value for the subordinated lenders and equity holders. However, such control comes at the cost of prejudice to the rights, and potentially to the security position, of Romspen and Meridian. In this regard, the circumstances are similar to those in *Callidus Capital Corp. v. Carcap Inc.*, 2012 ONSC 163, 84 C.B.R. (5th) 300.

[117] The Debtors have experienced a liquidity crisis since August 2018. None of the Debtors has any working capital with which to carry on business. The Debtors have explored a number of sales and refinancing options and have been unsuccessful. There is no sale or refinancing

option available to the Debtors at the present time. The CCAA Application is the only means available to them to preserve control over the continued construction of the Project.

[118] The purpose of the CCAA Application is to maximize the value of the Project. In the abstract, this is a desirable objective. However, in the present circumstances, it is not. It is the hope of the CCAA Applicants that sufficient value will be realized upon completion of the Project to make a sale or refinancing transaction feasible. If they are successful in realizing additional value, the subordinate creditors and the equity holders will benefit. However, if they are unsuccessful, Romspen and, in an extreme case, Meridian may well suffer a loss. The proposed CCAA proceeding therefore places the risk of a reduction in the value on Romspen and Meridian.

[119] This is inconsistent with the purpose of the CCAA which is to preserve the status quo in order to facilitate a plan of compromise or arrangement among the creditors of a debtor company, not to transfer risk, and potentially value, from senior creditors to junior creditors and equity holders without the consent of the senior creditors.

[120] Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the CCAA Applicants have failed to establish that the prejudice to the Receivership Applicants is offset by the benefits of the proposed CCAA proceeding.

#### **The Respective Costs of a Receivership Versus a CCAA Proceeding**

[121] Romspen alleges that the costs of a receivership will be less than the costs of a CCAA proceeding. While this is acknowledged by the CCAA Applicants, the parties dispute the extent of the difference. Counsel agree that the disputed difference is roughly \$5-6 million i.e. between a difference of \$5 million and a difference of \$11 million. The difference pertains largely to the difference in the estimated costs discussed above in respect of the financing plans of the parties. Romspen says this consideration is important in respect of its position as a secured lender to the extent that the security for the Loan may not exceed, or only minimally exceeds, the current value of the Properties, which it considers to be the case.


[122] However, for the reasons discussed above, the Court is not in a position to make any determination on the likely difference in costs between these two proceedings beyond the agreed difference of \$5 million. Any other figure would be speculative based on operational assumptions regarding the Project construction operations that may or may not prove to be appropriate.

[123] The more important cost considerations, which have been addressed above, are the extent to which the CCAA proceeding would result in less control over the financing of the much larger costs of completion of the Project, in a larger advance under the DIP Facility than would otherwise have been made under the Receivership Financing, and in a larger subordination of the security position of Romspen and Meridian.

[124] Accordingly, while the CCAA proceeding appears to entail costs of at least \$5 million more than as receivership proceedings, the fact that a receivership proceeding would be less expensive than a CCAA proceeding is, by itself, not a significant factor in the Court's determination in this Endorsement.

**Conclusions**

[125] Based on the considerations addressed above, I conclude that it would not be appropriate to grant the CCAA Application and that it is instead just and convenient to grant the Receivership Application for the appointment of a receiver without a power of sale in respect of the Properties.



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Wilton-Siegel J.

**Date:** December 10, 2018

**BDC CAPITAL INC.**

and

**BLUERUSH INC. et al.**

Court File No.:

Applicant

Respondents

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**ONTARIO  
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE  
(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

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**FACTUM OF THE APPLICANT**

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